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Jennifer Nagel
Jennifer Nagel
Professor of Philosophy, University of Toronto
Verified email at utoronto.ca - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs
J Nagel, V San Juan, RA Mar
Cognition 129 (3), 652-661, 2013
2082013
Intuitions and experiments: A defense of the case method in epistemology
J Nagel
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3), 495-527, 2012
1922012
Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes
J Nagel
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2), 279-294, 2008
1492008
Knowledge as a mental state
J Nagel
Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4, 273-306, 2013
1312013
Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error
J Nagel
The Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239), 286-306, 2010
1292010
Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism
J Nagel
Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1), 407-435, 2010
1112010
Epistemic intuitions
J Nagel
Philosophy Compass 2 (6), 792-819, 2007
1052007
Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction
J Nagel
Oxford University Press, 2014
1002014
The reliability of epistemic intuitions
K Boyd, J Nagel
Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, 2012
582012
The psychological basis of the Harman-Vogel paradox
J Nagel
Philosophers' Imprint 10 (15), 1-28, 2011
572011
The social value of reasoning in epistemic justification
J Nagel
Episteme 12 (2), 297-308, 2015
432015
Gendler on alief
J Nagel
Analysis 72 (4), 774-788, 2012
382012
The empiricist conception of experience
J Nagel
Philosophy 75 (03), 345-376, 2000
382000
Defending the evidential value of epistemic intuitions: A reply to Stich
J Nagel
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1), 179-199, 2013
362013
Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases
J Nagel
Knowledge Ascriptions, 171-191, 2012
352012
Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution
J Nagel
Mind & Language 32 (5), 525-544, 2017
342017
Armchair-friendly experimental philosophy
K Mortensen, J Nagel
A companion to experimental philosophy, 53-70, 2016
28*2016
Authentic Gettier cases: A reply to Starmans and Friedman
J Nagel, R Mar, V San Juan
Cognition 129 (3), 666-669, 2013
282013
Sensitive knowledge: Locke on skepticism and sensation
J Nagel
A Companion to Locke 96, 313, 2015
24*2015
II—Intuition, reflection, and the command of knowledge
J Nagel
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1), 219-241, 2014
232014
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Articles 1–20