| Health care payment systems: cost and quality incentives CA Ma Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 3 (1), 93-112, 1994 | 586 | 1994 |
| Optimal health insurance and provider payment CTA Ma, TG McGuire The American Economic Review, 685-704, 1997 | 366 | 1997 |
| Unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents CT Ma The Review of Economic Studies 55 (4), 555-572, 1988 | 266 | 1988 |
| Stopping agents from “cheating” CT Ma, J Moore, S Turnbull Journal of Economic Theory 46 (2), 355-372, 1988 | 257 | 1988 |
| Costs And Incentives In A Behavioral Health Carve-Out: Massachusetts saw a drop in mental health/substance abuse care costs for state employees when it entered into a contract … CA Ma, TG McGuire Health Affairs 17 (2), 53-69, 1998 | 250 | 1998 |
| Quality competition, welfare, and regulation CA Ma, JF Burgess Jr Journal of Economics 58 (2), 153-173, 1993 | 189 | 1993 |
| Bargaining with deadlines and imperfect player control CA Ma, M Manove Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1313-1339, 1993 | 159 | 1993 |
| Optimal health care contract under physician agency P Choné, CA Ma Annals of Economics and Statistics/Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, 229-256, 2011 | 142 | 2011 |
| Moonlighting: public service and private practice G Biglaiser, C Albert Ma The RAND Journal of Economics 38 (4), 1113-1133, 2007 | 140 | 2007 |
| Health insurance, moral hazard, and managed care CT Albert Ma, MH Riordan Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 11 (1), 81-107, 2002 | 139 | 2002 |
| Efficient allocation of a “prize”-King Solomon's dilemma J Glazer, CA Ma Games and Economic Behavior 1 (3), 222-233, 1989 | 115 | 1989 |
| Contract Penalties, Monopolizig Strategies, and Antitrust Policy JF Brodley, CA Ma Stan. L. Rev. 45, 1161, 1992 | 106 | 1992 |
| Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion I Alger, CA Ma Journal of economic behavior & organization 50 (2), 225-247, 2003 | 101 | 2003 |
| Renegotiation and optimality in agency contracts CTA Ma The Review of Economic Studies 61 (1), 109-129, 1994 | 101 | 1994 |
| Adverse selection in dynamic moral hazard CA Ma The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (1), 255-275, 1991 | 100 | 1991 |
| A signaling theory of unemployment CA Ma, AM Weiss European Economic Review 37 (1), 135-157, 1993 | 92 | 1993 |
| Competition, gatekeeping, and health care access G Godager, T Iversen, CA Ma Journal of Health Economics 39, 159-170, 2015 | 76 | 2015 |
| Health insurance, treatment plan, and delegation to altruistic physician T Liu, CA Ma Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 85, 79-96, 2013 | 74 | 2013 |
| Network incentives in managed health care CT Albert Ma, TG McGuire Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 11 (1), 1-35, 2002 | 70 | 2002 |
| Price and quality competition under adverse selection: market organization and efficiency G Biglaiser, CA Ma RAND Journal of Economics, 266-286, 2003 | 63 | 2003 |
Tor IversenProfessor of health economics at the University of OsloVerified email at medisin.uio.no
