Follow
Johan E Gustafsson
Johan E Gustafsson
University of Texas at Austin
Verified email at kth.se - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
In Defence of My Favourite Theory
JE Gustafsson, O Torpman
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2), 159-174, 2014
982014
Conflicting Reasons in the Small‐Improvement Argument
JE Gustafsson, N Espinoza
The Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241), 754-763, 2010
442010
What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?
S Zuber, N Venkatesh, T Tännsjö, C Tarsney, HO Stefánsson, K Steele, ...
Utilitas, 1-5, 2021
412021
Population Axiology and the Possibility of a Fourth Category of Absolute Value
JE Gustafsson
Economics & Philosophy 36 (1), 81-110, 2020
412020
Money-Pump Arguments
JE Gustafsson
Cambridge University Press, 2022
392022
Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument
JE Gustafsson
Utilitas 25 (4), 433-445, 2013
292013
A Money‐Pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences
JE Gustafsson
dialectica 64 (2), 251-257, 2010
272010
Freedom of Choice and Expected Compromise
JE Gustafsson
Social Choice and Welfare 35 (1), 65-79, 2010
272010
Combinative Consequentialism and the Problem of Act Versions
JE Gustafsson
Philosophical Studies 167 (3), 585-596, 2014
252014
Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’
JE Gustafsson
Noûs 48 (3), 466-473, 2014
212014
The Irrelevance of the Diachronic Money-Pump Argument for Acyclicity
JE Gustafsson
The Journal of Philosophy 110 (8), 460-464, 2013
202013
A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism
JE Gustafsson
Analysis 77 (4), 705-715, 2017
192017
A Note in Defence of Ratificationism
JE Gustafsson
Erkenntnis 75 (1), 147-150, 2011
192011
Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem
JE Gustafsson
Philosophia 39 (2), 289-296, 2011
182011
A Computer Simulation of the Argument from Disagreement
JE Gustafsson, M Peterson
Synthese 184 (3), 387-405, 2012
172012
A Simpler, More Compelling Money Pump with Foresight
JE Gustafsson, W Rabinowicz
The Journal of Philosophy 117 (10), 578-589, 2020
162020
The Difference Principle Would Not Be Chosen behind the Veil of Ignorance
JE Gustafsson
The Journal of Philosophy 115 (11), 588-604, 2018
162018
Bentham’s Binary Form of Maximizing Utilitarianism
JE Gustafsson
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (1), 87-109, 2018
162018
Did Locke Defend the Memory Continuity Criterion of Personal Identity?
JE Gustafsson
Locke Studies 10, 113-129, 2010
162010
Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion
JE Gustafsson
The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics, 371-389, 2022
132022
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–20