Dylan Murray
Dylan Murray
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Cited by
Cited by
Explaining away incompatibilist intuitions
D Murray, E Nahmias
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2), 434-467, 2014
Experimental philosophy on free will: An error theory for incompatibilist intuitions
E Nahmias, D Murray
New waves in philosophy of action, 189-216, 2011
Judgment before principle: engagement of the frontoparietal control network in condemning harms of omission
F Cushman, D Murray, S Gordon-McKeon, S Wharton, JD Greene
Social cognitive and affective neuroscience 7 (8), 888-895, 2012
God knows (but does God believe?)
D Murray, J Sytsma, J Livengood
Philosophical studies 166 (1), 83-107, 2013
Effects of manipulation on attributions of causation, free will, and moral responsibility
D Murray, T Lombrozo
Cognitive science 41 (2), 447-481, 2017
Situationism, going mental, and modal akrasia
D Murray
Philosophical Studies 172 (3), 711-736, 2015
Risk and Motivation: When the Will is Required to Determine What to Do
D Murray, L Buchak
Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will
D Murray
Ethics 129 (2), 412-416, 2019
Alfred Mele, Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will
D Murray
Hijacking Reason: The Moral Ecology of Implicit Bias
DW Murray
eScholarship, University of California, 2017
Experiments on Causal Exclusion Thomas Blancharda, Dylan Murray2 and Tania Lombrozob, 3 Forthcoming in Mind and Language
T Blancharda, D Murray
When it’s wrong not to act: How the brain processes harmful omissions
F Cushman, S Gordon-McKeon, D Murray, S Wharton, J Greene
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