| Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analyses T Brambor, WR Clark, M Golder Political analysis 14 (1), 63-82, 2006 | 7429 | 2006 |
| Rehabilitating Duverger’s theory: Testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws WR Clark, M Golder Comparative Political Studies 39 (6), 679-708, 2006 | 546 | 2006 |
| The political economy of monetary institutions W Bernhard, JL Broz, WR Clark International Organization 56 (4), 693-723, 2002 | 376* | 2002 |
| Principles of comparative politics WR Clark, M Golder, SN Golder CQ Press, 2017 | 373* | 2017 |
| Mobile capital, domestic institutions, and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy WR Clark, M Hallerberg American Political Science Review 94 (2), 323-346, 2000 | 344 | 2000 |
| Capitalism, not globalism: capital mobility, central bank independence, and the political control of the economy WR Clark University of Michigan Press, 0 | 201* | |
| A simple multivariate test for asymmetric hypotheses WR Clark, MJ Gilligan, M Golder Political Analysis 14 (3), 311-331, 2006 | 176 | 2006 |
| International and domestic constraints on political business cycles in OECD economies WR Clark, UN Reichert, SL Lomas, KL Parker International Organization 52 (1), 87-120, 1998 | 174 | 1998 |
| Agents and structures: two views of preferences, two views of institutions WR Clark International Studies Quarterly 42 (2), 245-270, 1998 | 169 | 1998 |
| Political business cycles in EU accession countries M Hallerberg, LV de Souza, WR Clark European Union Politics 3 (2), 231-250, 2002 | 140 | 2002 |
| Big data, causal inference, and formal theory: Contradictory trends in political science?: Introduction WR Clark, M Golder PS: Political Science & Politics 48 (1), 65-70, 2015 | 117 | 2015 |
| Are African party systems different? T Brambor, WR Clark, M Golder Electoral Studies 26 (2), 315-323, 2007 | 107 | 2007 |
| The British Academy Brian Barry prize essay: An exit, voice and loyalty model of politics WR Clark, M Golder, SN Golder British Journal of Political Science 47 (4), 719-748, 2017 | 101* | 2017 |
| Partisan and electoral motivations and the choice of monetary institutions under fully mobile capital WR Clark International Organization 56 (4), 725-749, 2002 | 93 | 2002 |
| The political resource curse: an empirical re-evaluation D Wiens, P Poast, WR Clark Political Research Quarterly 67 (4), 783-794, 2014 | 92 | 2014 |
| Measures of financial openness and interdependence WR Clark, M Hallerberg, M Keil, TD Willett Journal of Financial Economic Policy 4 (1), 58-75, 2012 | 74* | 2012 |
| Domestic and international asymmetries in United States–European Union trade negotiations Duchesne, Meunier International Negotiation 5 (1), 69-95, 2000 | 66 | 2000 |
| Independent but not indifferent: Partisan bias in monetary policy at the fed WR Clark, V Arel‐Bundock Economics & Politics 25 (1), 1-26, 2013 | 48 | 2013 |
| Monetary institutions and the political survival of democratic leaders WR Clark, SN Golder, P Poast International Studies Quarterly 57 (3), 556-567, 2013 | 30* | 2013 |
| Fiscal policy and the democratic process in the European Union WR Clark, M Golder, SN Golder European Union Politics 3 (2), 205-230, 2002 | 29 | 2002 |
Matt GolderProfessor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State UniversityVerified email at psu.edu
