Nisarg Shah
TitleCited byYear
Beyond dominant resource fairness: Extensions, limitations, and indivisibilities
DC Parkes, AD Procaccia, N Shah
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 3 (1), 1-22, 2015
1822015
The unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash welfare
I Caragiannis, D Kurokawa, H Moulin, AD Procaccia, N Shah, J Wang
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 7 (3), 1-32, 2019
1642019
No agent left behind: Dynamic fair division of multiple resources
I Kash, AD Procaccia, N Shah
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 51, 579-603, 2014
1312014
When do noisy votes reveal the truth?
I Caragiannis, AD Procaccia, N Shah
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 4 (3), 1-30, 2016
1022016
A Maximum Likelihood Approach For Selecting Sets of Alternatives
AD Procaccia, S Reddy, N Shah
Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 695-704, 2012
662012
Subset selection via implicit utilitarian voting
I Caragiannis, S Nath, AD Procaccia, N Shah
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 58, 123-152, 2017
502017
Preference elicitation for participatory budgeting
G Benade, S Nath, AD Procaccia, N Shah
Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
442017
Diverse randomized agents vote to win
A Jiang, LS Marcolino, AD Procaccia, T Sandholm, N Shah, M Tambe
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2573-2581, 2014
432014
Fair Public Decision Making
V Conitzer, R Freeman, N Shah
Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 629-646, 2017
382017
Leximin allocations in the real world
D Kurokawa, AD Procaccia, N Shah
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation …, 2015
332015
Modal ranking: A uniquely robust voting rule
I Caragiannis, AD Procaccia, N Shah
Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014
332014
Fair allocation of indivisible public goods
B Fain, K Munagala, N Shah
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 575-592, 2018
282018
Reliability Weighted Voting Games
Y Bachrach, N Shah
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2013
252013
Defender (mis) coordination in security games
AX Jiang, AD Procaccia, Y Qian, N Shah, M Tambe
Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013
242013
Voting rules as error-correcting codes
AD Procaccia, N Shah, Y Zick
Artificial Intelligence 231, 1-16, 2016
222016
Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users
A Agarwal, D Mandal, DC Parkes, N Shah
Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 81-98, 2017
212017
Electing the Most Probable Without Eliminating the Irrational: Voting Over Intransitive Domains.
E Elkind, N Shah
UAI, 182-191, 2014
21*2014
Agent failures in totally balanced games and convex games
Y Bachrach, I Kash, N Shah
International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 15-29, 2012
192012
Cooperative max games and agent failures
Y Bachrach, R Savani, N Shah
AAMAS'14: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS …, 2014
182014
Symbolic algorithms for qualitative analysis of Markov decision processes with Büchi objectives
K Chatterjee, M Henzinger, M Joglekar, N Shah
Formal Methods in System Design 42 (3), 301-327, 2013
182013
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Articles 1–20