Measures of concentration M Hall, N Tideman Journal of the american statistical association 62 (317), 162-168, 1967 | 622 | 1967 |
A new and superior process for making social choices TN Tideman, G Tullock Journal of Political Economy 84 (6), 1145-1159, 1976 | 549 | 1976 |
Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules TN Tideman Social choice and welfare 4 (3), 185-206, 1987 | 438 | 1987 |
Collective decisions and voting: the potential for public choice N Tideman Routledge, 2017 | 280 | 2017 |
Discrimination by waiting time in merit goods D Nichols, E Smolensky, TN Tideman The American Economic Review 61 (3), 312-323, 1971 | 237 | 1971 |
The single transferable vote N Tideman Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (1), 27-38, 1995 | 167 | 1995 |
Indices of cheating on multiple-choice tests RB Frary, TN Tideman, TM Watts Journal of Educational Statistics 2 (4), 235-256, 1977 | 140 | 1977 |
Local versus national pollution control: Note S Peltzman, TN Tideman The American Economic Review 62 (5), 959-963, 1972 | 137 | 1972 |
Does the right to carry concealed handguns deter countable crimes? Only a count analysis can say F Plassmann, TN Tideman The Journal of Law and Economics 44 (S2), 771-798, 2001 | 128 | 2001 |
Impartial division of a dollar G De Clippel, H Moulin, N Tideman Journal of Economic Theory 139 (1), 176-191, 2008 | 116 | 2008 |
A tax on land value is neutral TN Tideman National Tax Journal 35 (1), 109-111, 1982 | 94 | 1982 |
Takings, moral evolution, and justice TN Tideman Columbia Law Review 88 (8), 1714-1730, 1988 | 86 | 1988 |
Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule TM Zavist, TN Tideman Social Choice and Welfare 6 (2), 167-173, 1989 | 82 | 1989 |
A Markov chain Monte Carlo analysis of the effect of two-rate property taxes on construction F Plassmann, TN Tideman Journal of Urban Economics 47 (2), 216-247, 2000 | 75 | 2000 |
Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting G Bordes, N Tideman Theory and Decision 30, 163-186, 1991 | 66 | 1991 |
How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections? F Plassmann, TN Tideman Social Choice and Welfare 42, 31-75, 2014 | 62 | 2014 |
Better voting methods through technology: The refinement-manageability trade-off in the single transferable vote N Tideman, D Richardson Public Choice 103 (1), 13-34, 2000 | 57 | 2000 |
Modeling the outcomes of vote-casting in actual elections TN Tideman, F Plassmann Electoral systems: Paradoxes, assumptions, and procedures, 217-251, 2011 | 52 | 2011 |
Statistical evaluation of voting rules J Green-Armytage, TN Tideman, R Cosman Social Choice and Welfare 46, 183-212, 2016 | 49 | 2016 |
The economics of efficient taxes on land N Tideman Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1995 | 45 | 1995 |