| Greedy transaction fee mechanisms for (non-) myopic miners Y Gafni, A Yaish arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.07793 5, 2022 | 22* | 2022 |
| Unified fair allocation of goods and chores via copies Y Gafni, X Huang, R Lavi, I Talgam-Cohen ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 11 (3-4), 1-27, 2023 | 20 | 2023 |
| VCG Under Sybil (False-name) Attacks--a Bayesian Analysis Y Gafni, R Lavi, M Tennenholtz arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.07210, 2019 | 8 | 2019 |
| Barriers to collusion-resistant transaction fee mechanisms Y Gafni, A Yaish arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.08564, 2024 | 6 | 2024 |
| From monopoly to competition: optimal contests prevail X Deng, Y Gafni, R Lavi, T Lin, H Ling Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 37 (5), 5608-5615, 2023 | 6 | 2023 |
| Long-term data sharing under exclusivity attacks Y Gafni, M Tennenholtz Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 739-759, 2022 | 3 | 2022 |
| Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions Y Gafni, M Tennenholtz arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.15181, 2022 | 2 | 2022 |
| Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation Y Gafni, R Lavi, M Tennenholtz Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 72, 99-135, 2021 | 2 | 2021 |
| Competitive Revenue Extraction from Time-Discounted Transactions in the Semi-Myopic Regime Y Gafni, A Yaish arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.08549, 2024 | 1 | 2024 |
| Prediction-Sharing During Training and Inference Y Gafni, R Gradwohl, M Tennenholtz International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 425-442, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Beyond Proportional Individual Guarantees for Binary Perpetual Voting Y Gafni, B Golan arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.08767, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Discrete and Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms Y Gafni, A Yaish The International Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy …, 2024 | | 2024 |
Aviv YaishYale UniversityVerified email at yale.edu
